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TRIPS: Protecting the Rights of Patent Holders and Addressing Public
Health Issues in Developing Countries
By
* Anthony P. Valach, Jr.
© 2005, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
Introduction
On April 15, 1994, the world began down an uncertain path that will either
lead to greater harmony and prosperity for all or widen the gap between
developed and developing countries. On this date, the signatory nations of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed an Agreement of Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).1 TRIPS is intended to reverse
worldwide thinking regarding trade from an anti-protectionist philosophy to one
of global competition. TRIPS achieves this transformation by establishing three
core commitments: national treatment, most-favored-nation-treatment, and
minimum standards.
Although TRIPS establishes a framework for all countries to harmonize
their intellectual property law, it does not come without controversy. The TRIPS
agreement aims to facilitate stronger protection for intellectual property rights,
investments in regulatory agencies to enforce these rights and more consistent
* Mr. Valach is a third year J.D. student at the Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Apr. 15, 1994), at
http:i/www.wto.org/english/docs_eIlegal_e/27-trips.pdf. (Last Visited on Oct. 31, 2004)
[hereinafter TRIPS]
regimes of protection across international borders. 2 But these three goals may
adversely impact the economic development and overall health of the citizens of
developing countries. One issue that has developed since the implementation of
TRIPS is the negative effect its patent protection provisions have had on
developing and least developed countries and their ability to access
pharmaceuticals. As a result of the patent protection, millions of people cannot
access drugs necessary to treat their conditions. This forces developing countries
to choose between allocating their limited resources to treat their citizens or
letting them die.
One concern is that the increased patent protection that TRIPS provides
will likely lead to higher pharmaceutical prices. TRIPS does contain provisions
that offer safeguards from patent abuse and the negative effects of patent
protection, but it is unclear how countries are to implement these safeguards to
their benefit. Members of the WTO found this issue to be of such a high level of
importance that the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar was devoted
exclusively to this issue.
3
This paper will address the following issues: first, an analysis of the
TRIPS provisions that potentially could be interpreted to allow developing
2 Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic
Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 457, 457 (2001).
3 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Nov. 14, 2001), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/minOl-e/mindecl tripse.pdf. (Last Visited on Oct.
31, 2004) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]
countries to access pharmaceuticals absent a direct sale or license from the patent-
holder; second, an examination of the Doha Declaration of November 2001 and
its effect on the potential interpretation of the aforementioned TRIPS provisions;
third, a discussion on the current developments that have occurred with regard to
the Doha Declaration; and finally, a discussion of the conflicts between the
United States and developing countries over compulsory licensing. This paper
concludes with commentator's view on the matter and possible solutions.
I. The Availability of Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS Articles
30 and 31
Developing countries have interpreted Articles 30 and 31 to allow countries to
grant compulsory licenses to third parties to manufacture the necessary
pharmaceuticals that would be able to address public health issues such as, for
example, HIV/AIDS.4 Compulsory licensing permits the manufacture and use of
generic drugs without the agreement of the patent holder. 5 Developed countries
generally disfavor compulsory licenses since a government of another country can
strip a patent-holder of his rights while reducing the amount spent on research and
development ("R&D"). The patent-holder is entitled to receive a reasonable
compensation for the compulsory license, determined by the country granting the
4 Samantha Shoell, Why Can't the Poor Access Lifesaving Medicines? An Exploration of Solving
the Patent Issue, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 151, 180 (2002).
5 Review of TRIPS, Int'l Trade Daily News (BNA) (Int'l Trade Rep.) note 4, at D7 (June 9, 1999)
(highlighting the recent controversy surrounding the interpretation of compulsory licensing in
TRIPs).
license. 6 The rationale behind developed countries' granting compulsory licenses
is their belief that strong intellectual property protection will adversely affect the
public health by denying citizens access to life-saving, brand-name, prescription
drugs that they cannot afford.7 Developing counties also argue that public health
concerns are paramount to commercial profits, which puts developed countries in
the awkward position of being portrayed as profit conscious tyrants.
It is difficult to find a common interpretation of TRIPS Articles amongst
the WTO Members. There are different Articles within TRIPS, that when read in
conjunction with others, can lead a WTO Member to make a good faith
interpretation of the Article that may conflict with the interpretation of other
WTO Members. Although this would seem to be grounds for the Dispute
Resolution Unit of the WTO to address, the WTO has decided to address these
issues at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar to bring the WTO
Members to remedy this issue using more diplomatic means.
A. TRIPS Article 30
Article 30 is seen as a means to allow countries that do not have the ability
to manufacture pharmaceuticals to access them without violating TRIPS. It could
allow drug-producing countries to issue compulsory licenses without the Article
6 TRIPS, supra note 1, at Part II, sec. 5, art. 31(h).
7 The WHO Model List of Essential Drugs, at http://www.who.int/medicines/organization
/par/edi/infedimain.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
31 (f) requirement that the drugs be used exclusively in the domestic arena.
Article 30 eliminates this requirement through a broad interpretation that provides
exceptions to exclusive patent rights under three conditions: (1) the exception
must be limited; (2) it must not unreasonably conflict with the normal use of the
patent; and (3) the legitimate interests of the patent-holder must be protected,
while also taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties.
9
When TRIPS was originally negotiated Article 30 was seen as a
mechanism similar to "fair-use" of copyrighted materials. 10 This analogy was
made due to the similarity in language between Article 30 and Article 13, which
deals with exceptions to copyright rights." The United States has interpreted its
copyright "fair-use" doctrine as being consistent with Article 13 of TRIPS, but
has had trouble reading this into Article 30.
B. TRIPS Article 31
Article 31 provides a detailed means for a WTO Member state to grant use
of the subject matter of a patent without the consent of the patent-holder. Article
31 does not expressly refer to the term "compulsory license," but when read along
with Article 2(1) of TRIPS and Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention; the
8 Andrea M. Curti, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Unlikely Weapon in the
Fight Against AIDS, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 469, 481 (2001).
9 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, Part II, sec. 5, art. 30.
10 Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United
States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair Use
Exception, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1623, 1690 (2001).
allowance of compulsory licensing is implied. 12 Article 2(1) of TRIPS states that
WTO Members must comply with specific articles of the Paris Convention,
including Article 5, which permits the use of compulsory licensing. 13
Section (b) of Article 31 provides three exceptions for countries to
compromise a patent-holder's rights under certain circumstances, including a
"national emergency" exception. 14 The problem with the "national emergency"
exception under this Article is that there is no definition in TRIPS that specifies
what a national emergency is and reading the other Articles of TRIPS do not shed
any light on the subject. Even if Article 31(b) is interpreted broadly Article 31 (f)
presents a problem to countries that do not have the ability to manufacture
pharmaceuticals. Article 31 (f) can be interpreted as limiting the distribution of
goods produced under a compulsory license to "the domestic market."' 5 This
makes it impossible for developing countries that do not have the ability to
produce drugs to obtain them from countries that do. Article 31 would help
" See id. ("TRIPS Article 13 provides that "Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.")
12 Grace K. Avedissian, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward Compulsory
Licensing of Medical Inventions In a New Era of "Super Terrorism ", 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 237,
263 (2002).
13 TRIPS, supra note 1, at Part I, art. 2.
14 TRIPS, supra note 1, at Part II, sec. 5, art. 3 1(b). ("...such use may only be permitted if, prior
to such use, the proposed uses has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not bee successful within a
reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.
In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder
shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable....")
15 See id. at Part II, sec. 5, art. 31(f).
developed and developing countries that have the ability to produce
pharmaceuticals in the case of a "national emergency," but makes
pharmaceuticals unobtainable for the countries that would need to import them to
address their national emergency.
II. The Doha Declaration
A. Background
In November 2001, the TRIPS Council convened a special session to discuss
the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement and define the relationship between
intellectual property rights and access to essential medicines under the Agreement.
This session was necessary because there were several plausible divergent
interpretations of TRIPS that could be made in good faith that theoretically would
be consistent with TRIPS. The goal of the session was to give legal clarification
to issues that are ambiguous if left standing alone in the text of TRIPS.
There were several events that lead to the developing countries calling for the
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar to convene and to discuss how
TRIPS should be interpreted with respect to pharmaceutical patents. The most
pressing issue that the developing countries faced was the rising number of people
in their countries that were suffering due to a lack of access to drugs that combat
HIV/AIDS. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, over 29.4 million people are
currently living with HIV/AIDS; 3.5 million people contracted 16 the virus in
2002.17 In China, medical experts have predicted that 10 million people could be
infected with the virus by 2010.18
Developed and developing countries presented two conflicting points of view
at the special Conference. One the one hand, the congregation of developing
countries, lead by the Africa Group, the Association of South-East Asian Nations,
and Brazil, sought to clarify the TRIPS Articles that allow Members to promote
and protect public health and other overarching public policy objectives. 19  The
draft proposal of the developing countries addressed political principals to ensure
that TRIPS did not undermine the legitimate right of WTO Members to establish
their own domestic public health policies, including provisions related to
compulsory licenses, parallel imports, and countries that do not have the ability to
produce pharmaceuticals.
2 0
The developed countries, lead by the United States, argued that a strong patent
regime would produce benefits for all countries, while acknowledging the
16 Review of TRIPs, Int'l Trade Daily News (BNA) (Int'l Trade Rep.) note 4, at D7 (June 9, 1999)
(highlighting the recent controversy surrounding the interpretation of compulsory licensing in
TRIPs).
17 WHO/UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Updated, at http://www' unaids.org/html/pubipublications irc-
pub03/epiupdate2002 en pdf.htm. (Last Visited on Nov. 11, 2004)
18 People's Daily, China, US launch cooperation infighting AIDS, Xinhua's China Economic
Information Service, (Last updated on Nov. 8, 2004), at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/2 leng20031021 126464.shtml.
19 TRIPS and Public Health, submission of the Africa Group and other developing countries to
the Special TRIPS Council Meeting of June 2001, 5, at
http://www.twnside.or/.sg titleitwrl3 le.htm. (Last Visited on Nov. 11, 2004).
interests of developing countries in access to essential medicines. 21 The proposed
draft presented by these countries stressed the importance of the protection of
intellectual property since doing so would allow further research and development
22("R&D") of new treatments, which would contribute to global health objectives.
The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent bio-terrorism scare in the
United States, not only changed the face of the world, but also placed the United
States in an awkward position in terms of their trade policy. The anthrax scare
forced the United States and Canada to consider issuing a compulsory license on
Ciproflaxin (Cipro), the antibiotic used to treat anthrax, if the disease turned out
to be more wide-spread than it did.23 The two countries consideration of
producing these drugs generically to address a "national emergency" (22 reported
cases of anthrax, resulting in five deaths) 24 puts them at a disadvantage when
negotiating the scope of TRIPS. The disadvantage stems from the U.S. almost
declaring a "national emergency" for the anthrax scare when in the past the U.S.
has questioned countries declaring a national emergency where thousands of
20 Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long
Way From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 39 (Spring 2002).
21 James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and PUBLIC Health
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 296 (Spring
2002).
22 Supra note 20.
23 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 481, 515
(Summer 2002).
24 James Hughes and Julie Gerberding, Emerging Infectious Diseases. Anthrax Bioterrorism:
Lessons Learned and Future Directions, at http:v/www.cdc.gov/ncidodEIDivolgno10/02-
0466.htn (Last Visited on November 8, 2004).
people die everyday from treatable diseases. 25 The United States eventually
negotiated with Bayer to obtain Cipro at a reduced price.26 This also put the
United States in an awkward position since this was exactly the tactic the U.S.
criticized and prosecuted when Brazil used the threat of granting a compulsory
license to obtain cheaper HIV/AIDS drugs.27 These circumstances allowed the
developing countries to proffer a successful opposition to the U.S. when
negotiating the Doha Declaration, as is evident in the final draft.
The final draft of the unanimously adopted Doha Declaration addressed the
pharmaceuticals concerns of the WTO Member with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities. 2 8 The Declaration starts with the Members recognizing
the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing countries.
29
Further the Members agreed that the TRIPS Agreement "does not and should not
prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health" and should be
interpreted in a manner that promotes access to medicines for all. 30 The
Declaration also recognized the potential problem that Members with insufficient
or no manufacturing capacities to produce pharmaceuticals might face in making
effective use of the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and
therefore instructed the TRIPS Council to come up with a solution before 2002
25 Supra note 23 at 516.
26 Supra note 23 at 515-16.
27 Supra note 23 at 516.
28 Doha Declaration, supra note 4 at 6.
29 See id. at 1.
ended.3' It appeared that the only thing that came out of the Doha Declaration
was the Members acknowledgment of the existence of a problem. However,
recent developments have shown that the Members are now addressing the
problem consistent with the wishes of the developing world.
Current Developments In Conjunction With the Doha Declaration
The December 31, 2002 deadline to address the difficulties that WTO
Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities could face, as
addressed in 6 of the Doha Declaration passed without the parties reaching an
agreement. The U.S. caused the division between parties after its initial objection
of the solutions offered by the rest of the membership. The U.S. wanted the list of
epidemics eligible for compulsory licenses to be limited and specific.
32
Eventually, the U.S. backed down from this position and on August 30th, 2003
the WTO announced its decision to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration ("Decision"), essentially establishing a waiver on Article 31 (f)'s
"domestic market" restriction. 33' 34 The Decision allows any Member country to
export pharmaceuticals made under compulsory licenses as long as the export to
30 See id. at 4.
31 Doha Declaration, supra note 4, at 6.
32 Datuck Seri Rafidah Aziz, Cancun Conference: The Malaysian perspective, Ministry of
International Trade and Industry of Malaysia, at http:iiwww.miti.2ov.my/wto-cancun.html. (Last
Visited Nov. 8, 2004).
33 Implementation ofparagraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement andpublic
health (Aug. 30, 2003), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implempara6_e.htm. (Last
Visited Nov. 8, 2004).
34 TRIPS, supra note 1, at Part II, sec. 5, art. 3 1(f). (compulsory licensing must be
"predominately for the supply of the domestic market")
an eligible importing Member satisfies the requirements of Paragraphs 2 of the
Decision.3"'36 While the Decision allows all Member countries to take advantage
of the waiver, 23 countries stated in the Decision that they will not import
pharmaceuticals under the Decision, and another 11 countries stated they would
only use the waiver provision if an emergency or extremely urgent situation
arose.
37
On the face of the Decision, it seems as if the humanitarian objectives that
were defined in the Doha Declaration are being achieved. Upon further analysis,
however, it becomes apparent that the developing countries have to go though a
lot of red tape to purchase drugs from the developed countries, which goes against
the main goal of the Doha Declaration: to provide easy assess to pharmaceuticals
for developed and developing countries. In looking at the Decision, there are 10
possible steps that least developed and developing countries must go through
31 Supra note 33, at 2(a). (A compulsory license can be used to import a pharmaceutical product
if the importing country "(i) specifies the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed;
(ii) confirms that the eligible importing Member in question, other than a least developed country
Member, has established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question...; and (iii) confirms that, where a
pharmaceutical product is patented in its territory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory
licenses in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement...")
36 Supra note 33, at 2(b). (Compulsory licenses issued by the exporting Member shall be issued
if"(i) only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member(s) may be
manufactured under the license and the entirety of this production shall be exported to the
Member(s) which has notified its needs to the Council for TRIPS; (ii) products produced under the
license shall be clearly identified as being produced under the system set out in this Decision
through specific labeling or marketing. Suppliers should distinguish such products through special
packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products themselves, provided that such
distinction is feasible and does not have a significant impact on price...")
37 Supra note 33, at I(b).
before the drugs would be available to them.38 A country where the drug has been
patented that is seeking to import a drug through a compulsory license would first
have to seek a voluntary license on commercially reasonable terms for a
reasonable period of time. 39 Second, if the importing country was unsuccessful in
obtaining a voluntary license, they would have to apply to the WTO for a
compulsory license.40 Third, if the compulsory license is for import, the
importing country must assess its generic industry's capacity to produce the
medicine locally. 41 Fourth, if the capacity is insufficient, it must notify and
explain to the WTO the reason for its decision.42 Fifth, the importing country
must notify a potential exporter.43 Sixth, that exporter must in turn seek a
voluntary license on commercially reasonable terms for a reasonable period of
time. Seventh, that exporter must seek a compulsory license from its own
government on a single-country basis.45 Eighth, compensation by royalty must be
set based on standards of reasonableness in the importing country. 46 Ninth, if a
license is granted to a generic producer, the exporter must investigate pill size,
38 Importing countries that do not have the capacity to manufacture pharmaceuticals would have
to go through more steps than countries that have the ability to produce the drug in question
generically.
39 Brook Baker, Vows of Poverty, Shrunken Markets, Burdensome Manufacturing and Other
Nonsense at the WTO (Sept. 27, 2003), at
http:/ /www.healthgap.org press releasesi03 092703HGAP BP WTO Cancun.html. (Last






shape, color, labeling, and packaging of the patent-holder's product in the
importing country and differentiate its new product in all respects, regardless of
cost.4 7 And finally, the generic producer would need to seek product registration
and prove bio-equivalence based on a pill of different size and shape. This
process is complicated further because each step must be followed each time a
drug is exported, even if the same drug is being exported to another country. This
added procedural nightmare is not in the spirit of the Doha Declaration for it will
futher complicate matters for countries trying to provide relief for their citizens.
Citizens that are in desperate need of live-saving pharmaceuticals.
Five major parties are involved in fulfilling developing or least developed
country's pharmaceutical needs via compulsory licenses: the importing country;
the exporter; the exporting country; the patent-holder in the importing country;
and the WTO. The most interesting relationships exist between the importer and
exporter and between the exporting country and patent-holder. The exporting
country is in a very influential position in terms of affecting the global
marketplace for pharmaceuticals of all varieties, especially the generic market. If
an importing country specifically targets exporters who concentrate in the generic
market, an exporting country that believes in strong patent rights may decline to




export pharmaceuticals via a compulsory license from a developing or least
developed country be fulfilled by the actual patent-holder. If the exporting
country were to grant licenses to the patent-holder of the drug that is the subject
of a compulsory license from a developing country, this would only drive the
prices of the drug higher because there would be little or no incentive for these
parties to lower prices without the outside threat to its stronghold on the market
for the particular drug. If the exporting country were to grant the compulsory
license to a generic manufacturer, raising competition by making generics more
available, the patent-holder would lower prices. This decision appears to rest with
the exporting country, but the ramifications of their decision will no doubt affect
the worldwide market for pharmaceuticals. One would fear that the U.S. and its
allegiance with the large pharmaceutical companies and lobbyists, would lead the
U.S. to exclusively grant licenses to these parties in order to protect their patent
rights. Not only would this go against the spirit of TRIPS, but it would cause
other problems since the intention of the Decision was to lessen the burden on the
world, especially developing countries.
A more positive outcome results if countries with the ability to manufacture
drugs recognize and respond to the needs of developing and developed countries
by becoming a haven for the activity described in the Decision. Canada took
steps to do just that on November 6, 2003 by introducing legislation to amend its
current Patent Act to facilitate access to pharmaceuticals and to address public
health problems in developing and least developed countries. 48 The stated
purpose of the legislation is to facilitate access to pharmaceutical products to
address public health problems afflicting developing and least-developed
countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and
other epidemics.49 Just as some parties were critical of the scope of the WTO
Doha Declaration, some parties are also concerned that the proposed Canadian
bill is not as noble as it makes itself out to be. Some civil societies are critical
that the bill only includes a limited list of pharmaceuticals since restricting the list
conflicts with the non-specific approach that the Declaration was trying to
advance. 50 Limiting the list of pharmaceuticals in the negotiation of the
Declaration was one of the major points of contention that was keeping the parties
from reaching an agreement. 51 Only once the US agreed not to require such a list
did the parties agree to enact the Declaration. 52 Another point of contention is
that the proposed bill only allows its benefits to apply to WTO Members while
other non-WTO Members would be excluded.53 There seems to be no rational
basis for this in the proposed legislation and some parties are urging Parliament to
4' An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drug Act, Bill C-56, 51-52 Elizabeth II
(200202003), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/c-
56/c-56 1/90247bE.html. (Last Visited on Nov. 8, 2004).
49 Id.
50 Anso Thorn, Canada to Lift Patents on ARVs (Nov. 7, 2003), at http://www.journ-
aids.org/reports/07112003e.htm. (Last Visited on Nov. 8, 2004)
51 Supra note 32.
52 Supra note 33.
53 Supra note 50.
amend accordingly. 54 The proposed legislation also does not allow NGOs to
contract with a Canadian generic manufacturer to procure drugs under a
compulsory license; it only allows governments or its agents of developing
countries to do so.55 Some of the least developed countries may not even know
what is afflicting their citizens and must rely on outside sources to assist in the
treatment of their ill. In addressing a large-scale epidemic within a country, the
government may not have the capacity or knowledge of an NGO to administer the
drugs or handle the situation in the best manner. Allowing NGOs access to the
benefits of the proposed legislation would comport with the general objectives of
the legislation and provisions to facilitate such activity could easily be
implemented. Finally the proposed legislation provided a right of "first refusal,"
allowing patent holders to block licenses for generic manufacturers and to take
over the contract with the developing country. 56 This would discourage a generic
market, which is again against the objective of the proposed legislation to
promote public health and access to pharmaceuticals for all.57 All of these issues
will be addressed once the ruling party's leadership changes take place and the





57 Supra note 50.
58 id.
III. The United States, Developin2 Countries, and Compulsory
Licenses
The United States' policy on compulsory licensing has generally favored the
brand-name pharmaceutical industry. This has generated many political disputes
with foreign nations and special interest groups. But over the years, the United
States has sometimes abandoned its alliance with the pharmaceutical industry and
even has proposed legislation to address compulsory licensing both in the United
States and abroad. Most of these inconsistencies are due to pressure from public
and special interest groups and the need for the United States to use the remedy of
compulsory licensing to address domestic public health issues.
The United State Patent Act does not contain a provision addressing the issue
of compulsory licensing. 59 There are, however, certain statutory provisions that
authorize compulsory licensing for prevention of air pollution, public health
emergencies, government use, aerospace, atomic energy, national security and to
remedies for anti-competitive practices. 60 Although these statutory provisions are
not seen as vehicles for developing countries to change the United States' position
regarding compulsory licensing, some recent events, such as the Anthrax scare,
may be showing a shift towards a policy that would be friendlier to developing
countries. The first event occurred in 1997 when the South African Parliament
59 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2004).
60 Supra note 8, at 254-255.
passed compulsory licensing legislation to reduce the cost of pharmaceuticals.
61
The South African government saw compulsory licensing as the only way to
address the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in their country. Through compulsory
licensing, it hoped to give people who have contracted the virus access to
affordable treatment. The United States did not support the legislation because it
feared that submission to South Africa's intellectual property policy would set a
precedent for other countries to implement similar policies. 62 The United States
went as far as to threaten South Africa with trade sanctions if they were to
implement this legislation fearing that this could open the door for other countries
to break U.S. pharmaceutical patents. 63 The pharmaceutical industry also
attacked South Africa by filing a lawsuit challenging the law in the South African
courts. 64 This attack on South Africa's compulsory licensing legislation went on
for 2 years until the United States completely changed its policy as a result of
public and political recognition of the severity of the problem. What is interesting
to note is that during the period between 1996 through 2000, South Africa spent
$3 million on AIDS prevention and $1.3 on arms purchases during the same
period.65
61 Supra note 13, at 255.
62 Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crisis:
A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71, 72 (Spring 2001).
63 Supra note 13, at 25.
64 Id at 255-256.
65 Daniel Pruzin, Rewriting TRIPS Could Hurt Research, Pharmaceutical Industry Strongly
Warns WTO, Bureau of National Affairs (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/bna09202001 .html. (Last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
Another incident involving Brazil is evidence that the U.S. is susceptible to
changing its stance when outside pressure is applied. In 1996, the Brazilian
government began producing generic equivalents of eight HIV/AIDS medications
in state laboratories to address the growing public health crisis by offering free
drugs to HIV/AIDS patients within its borders. 66,67 Brazil requires holders of its
patents to manufacture the product in question within Brazil. If this so-called
"local working" requirement is not met within 3 years the product shall be subject
to compulsory licensing. 68 The only exception to this "local working"
requirement is if a patent-holder can show that it is not economically feasible to
produce in Brazil or can otherwise show that the requirement to produce locally is
not reasonable; if proven, then the compulsory licensing provision would not be
applied. 69 Also under the Brazilian Patent Law, a company trying to escape the
compulsory licensing provision by importing instead of manufacturing in Brazil
would not be subject to the compulsory licensing provision, but would then
subject its product to parallel importing by others.
70
66 John Zarocostas, U.S., Brazil Differ on Aids Drug Patent at WTO, UPI Science News (Feb. 2,
2001), available at http://www.survivreausida.net/article3289.html. (Last Visited on Nov. 8, 2004).
67 Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS
Agreement: An Analysis of the US-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 380. (Summer
2002).
68 Ellen 't Hoen, Public Health and International Law: TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and
Access to Essential Medicines: a Long Way From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 32
(Spring 2002).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 32-33.
To achieve its goal of providing HIV/AIDS drugs for its infected citizens, the
Brazilian government used a three-prong attack. The first prong was to
manufacture locally HIV/AIDS drugs that were not subject to patent protection
within Brazil.71 Next, for those drugs that were patented in Brazil, the
government would attempt to negotiate a deal with the patent-holder to obtain the
drugs at a price that would allow the Brazilian government to provide them to its
citizens for free. 72 When Brazil and the patent-holder could not reach an
acceptable deal, Brazil would take a hard-line approach and threaten to issue a
compulsory license unless the drug in question was discounted by 50%. 73 To
further support the first two prongs of its attack on high-priced HIV/AIDS drugs,
Brazil used the argument that producing generic versions of these HIV/AIDS
medications fell within the TRIPS national emergency exemption which allows
the government to override patents in urgent circumstances. 74 Although the U.S.
was against Brazil's activity and legislation enacted to facilitate the production of
the generic HIV/AIDS drugs, it was not until January 8 h , 2001 that the U.S.
finally requested the WTO Dispute Resolution Panel to convene in order to
investigate the legality of Article 68 of the Brazilian Patent Law.75 The U.S.
claimed that the Brazilian law lessening a patent holder's rights violated Article
71 Supra note 66.
72 Supra note 66, at 380-38 1.
73 Geoff Dyer, Brazil Defiant Over Cheap AIDS Drugs, Fin Times (Feb. 9, 2001), at 10
74 Supra note 65.
27.1 and 28.1 of TRIPS by discriminating against U.S. owners of Brazilian
Patents.
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On June 23, 2001, Brazil and the U.S. issued a joint statement announcing
that the U.S. would withdraw request of the WTO panel against Brazil.77 In
withdrawing its request for a panel, Brazil agreed to give advance notice to U.S.
officials before invoking the "local working" requirement that was implemented
in its Patent Law.78 The real reason why the U.S. dropped its request for a panel
was the public-relations disaster that ensued and the highly effective counter-
campaign that Brazil launched against the U.S. 79 The problem with the stance of
the U.S. was not its legality, but the fact that it was threatening the most
successful AIDS treatment program in the developing world.80 There are an
estimated 536,000 Brazilians infected with HIV, with 203,353 cases of AIDS
reported from 1980 through December 2000. 81 The success of the Brazilian
AIDS program and the enacted patent legislation reduced the AIDS-related
mortality rate by more than 50% between 1996 and 1999 and during a two-year
span, Brazil saved $472 million in hospital costs and treatment costs for AIDS-
7' Kara M. Bombach, Can South Africa Fight Aids? Reconciling the South African Medicines and
Related Substances Act with the TRIPS Agreement, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 273, 298 (Fall 2001).
76 Brazil Measures Affecting Patent Protection (Jan. 9, 2001), at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/iP/d/23A 1.doc. (Last Visited Nov. 11,2004).
77 Helene Cooper, U.S. Drops WTO Complaint Against Brazilian Patent Law, WALL ST. J., June
26, 2001, at B7.
78 Supra note 72.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Supra note 68, at 32.
related infections. 82 This put the U.S. at an even greater disadvantage for arguing
the illegality of the Brazilian Patent legislation since it was public opinion that
humanitarian success trumped the U.S.'s plea for patent protection. The Brazilian
Health Minister was quick to point out the obvious disparity between the interests
that both sides were advancing once it was clear that other Members of the WTO
and the NGO community would be more sympathetic to Brazil's plight than that
of the U.S's.
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This presents the obvious question that if Brazil and the international
community were able to shake-down the U.S. to advance its interest in providing
free HIV/AIDS medicines, why don't other developing countries use the same
approach? The answer is that although Brazil is considered a developing country,
it does have the technological capacity to develop the technology necessary to
manufacture pharmaceuticals. Also Brazil's government is concerned more with
the immediate welfare of its suffering citizens than protecting the rights of patent
holders. This is the argument that has garnered support worldwide in Brazil's
successful defense against the U.S. Until August 30, 2003, in order for Brazil to
comply with Article 31 of TRIPS, it could only use the generic pharmaceuticals
that it produced in the domestic market. It remains to be seen if the waiver agreed
to on the "domestic use" requirement in Article 31 (f) of TRIPS will be unitized by
Brazil to export their generic pharmaceutical to other developing countries. There
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are a couple of factors that Brazil must consider in order for this to be feasible.
First, Brazil must determine if exporting of generics can be done without
undermining their objective of providing free HIV/AIDS drugs to its citizens.
Although exporting generics to other developing countries will undoubtedly help
Brazil's fledgling economy, Brazil may not have the manufacturing capacity to
satisfy both markets. Also, Brazil must consider if providing generics to
developing countries will be as successful as its own battle in diminishing the
AIDS-related death rate. Brazil's situation is unique because it has the
infrastructure set up to adequately educate patients and properly distribute the
drugs. Many other least-developed countries would not be as successful as Brazil
since the governmental infrastructure of such countries would not be able to
implement a program to ensure that providing its citizens with HIV/AIDS drugs
would be effective in combating the public health crisis.
Also, there is an issue as to whether Article 68 of the Brazilian Patent
Legislation is actually in the best interest of the country. Although there are the
obviously direct and immediate advantages to the system as detailed above, what
exactly does this mean for Brazil's intellectual property system and economy in
the future? This leads into the drug industry's argument against the granting of
compulsory licenses by developing and least-developed countries and the
implementation of the Doha Declaration. The drug industry's stance against
83 Id. at 33.
compulsory licensing centers on its argument that granting compulsory licenses
is a threat to good public health because it would deny patients around the world
the future benefits of R&D in the research-based industry from which new
therapies arise.84 The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Associations ("IFPMA") advanced its view that uncertainty in TRIPS
enforcement is likely to be a disincentive for investors to provide the capital
necessary to develop more effective drugs. 85 Specifically, IFPMA noted that
there has been a 30% decline in the number of anti-retroviral drug companies in
preclinical and clinical development since 1998, a period that corresponds with
the "growing attacks on intellectual property rights linked to AIDS medicines."
86
IFPMA's argument may hold some weight in that further research will provide
more effective HIV/AIDS drugs and possibly even a cure, but this prove difficult
without the necessary funding due to worldwide patent rights being uncertain.
But is the advancement toward a cure worth prolonging the pain and suffering
that people currently infected would face without access to the current drugs on
the market? The problem with this question is that there is no right answer since
weighing the suffering of the few for a potential benefit of the many is such a hard
issue to deal with.
84 Supra note 65.
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On May 3, 2001, a bill to amend the United States Patent Act called the
Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions Act, which provides
compulsory licensing of certain patented inventions relating to health, was
introduced by Representative Sherrod Brown (D-OH). 87 The bill outlined specific
instances in which the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) could issue a compulsory license to produce a
pharmaceutical or medical invention. The bill also gave the Secretary of Health
& Human Services and the FTC the authority to jointly adopt regulations that
would implement the purposes of this bill, consistent with TRIPS." This
proposed bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Health where it remained until
the 10 7 th Congress adjourned.8 9
On November 6, 2001, Representative Brown introduced the Public Health
Emergency Medicines Act.90 This bill sought to amend the Patent Act to grant
the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to authorize use of the
subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the patent-holder or to
authorize a compulsory license if the Secretary determines that the invention is
needed to address a public health emergency. 9 1 The bill would also allow the
Secretary of Health & Human Services to do the same if such medicines are
17 H.R. 1708, 107' Cong. (2001)
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 thH.R. 3252, 107  Cong. (2001)
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needed to address global public health emergencies, when the legitimate rights of
the patent-holder are protected in the export market.92 This bill was referred to
the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, where it
eventually died in committee.
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This is the extent to which the U.S. has tried to implement compulsory
licensing legislation after the Doha Declaration. Although these bills may have
been a quick response resulting from the Declaration, it does not appear as though
Congress is going to deviate from its strict protectionist views.
IV. Conclusion
So where does this leave the United States, developed countries that are
sympathetic to the "humanitarian" plight of developing counties, and developing
countries? No matter what type of legislation is enacted in response to the
Declaration in any WTO Member country, there will always be some party that
will feel it is not being adequately represented and that the general objectives of
the Declaration and TRIPS are not being followed. But the U.S. is now on the
defensive to preserve the patent protection that it believed it was going to be
afforded when it agreed to the TRIPS agreement. With developed countries such
as Canada enacting legislation to provide generic drugs to countries in need and
NGOs and developing countries portraying the U.S. as a money-hungry,
inhumane mongrel, the U.S. has to work something out that will satisfy the
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pharmaceutical companies and the rest of the world. If the U.S. is not able to
satisfy the interests of its domestic pharmaceutical industry, it is going to be
susceptible to being "shaken-down" in the same manner that Brazil was
successful in advancing its own interests by enacting its own domestic patent
legislation. So what does the U.S. do to improve its image while advancing its
own interests in economic growth and technological advancement? Its best
option would be to advance further humanitarian efforts through an international
agency, such as the U.N. The U.S. has already shown that its policies are capable
of being influenced by NGOs and third parties and that it will use some of the
TRIPS provisions when it is beneficial to their interests and criticize others when
doing the same. To combat this, an international body should be established to
ensure that if developing countries are using TRIPS to acquire or manufactures
pharmaceuticals that an infrastructure be set up to ensure that the drugs are being
used properly and the people that are using them are educated to properly utilize
the drugs. This will enable the U.S. to revive its tarnished image, advance the
interests of humanity, and place the burden of funding, such an international
agency, on the world as a whole.
Patents are a monopoly that an inventor is entitled to for a limited period of
time. So what happens when that limited period of time expires? One of the
objectives of patent law as a whole is that a patent is a bargain between the
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inventor and the public for which the inventor is allowed to exploit an invention
for a certain amount of time in exchange for disclosing his invention to the public.
Most of the pharmaceuticals that address the public health emergencies around
the world are not yet in the public domain. When these patents expire, there will
likely be more effective drugs on the market to treat the same diseases, but the
ones that are on the market right now will still be effective. This will allow
developing countries that have the capacity to manufacture pharmaceuticals to
produce the drugs for themselves. This ability will not only allow the developing
country to address medical emergencies within its own borders, but will also
provide the mechanism to advance the developing country into a developed
country. This mechanism, assuming that the waiver on TRIPS Article 3 1(f) is
still enforced, will allow a new generic pharmaceutical industry that will make
pharmaceuticals available to countries that do not have the capacity to
manufacture the drugs themselves. Since the country producing the generic drugs
will be sympathetic to the plight of the least-developed country, it will most likely
seek a reasonable profit instead of trying to "pad" its pockets for R&D on new
drugs. The R&D of new drugs can be left to the developed countries that have
been producing drugs that have since fallen out of patent protection. And now,
with the developing countries on their way to becoming developed, the R&D cost
will be easier to recoup because a U.S. versus Brazil type dispute would be
unlikely to result since the developing country would be in a better position,
through its own generic pharmaceutical industry, to purchase the drugs. This will
lead to greater economic harmony, foster further R&D, and address grave
worldwide public health concerns.
